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# Collision resistance vs second preimage resistance

Collision Resistance Collision resistance also has similarities with the second preimage resistance, and because of this, collision resistance can also be called weak collision resistance. However, before a hash function can be referred to as collision resistance, it must have a minimum of 160 bits length Second pre-image resistance simply has more constraints than collision resistance. In your examples, x1 and x2 are the inputs, and h (x1) and h (x2) are the outputs. For second pre-image resistance, you are given x1, and must find an input (x2) that hashes to the same output value. You do not get to choose x1 in this attack This property is sometimes referred to as weak collision resistance, and functions that lack this property are vulnerable to second-preimage attacks. Collision resistance It should be difficult to find two different messages m 1 and m 2 such that hash( m 1) = hash( m 2). Such a pair is called a cryptographic hash collision

The only difference that I can see is that in a second preimage attack, m1 already exists and is known to the attacker. However, that doesn't strike me as being significant - the end goal is still to find two messages that produce the same hash Our results show that second-preimage resistance and collision resistance are equivalent, in an asymptotic sense (i.e., considering only whether a quantity is negligible or not). However, as might be expected, it is quadratically easier to nd collisions than second preimages, due to birthday attacks. Our concrete bounds re ect this

### Preimage Resistance, Second Preimage Resistance, and

• Collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance, but does not guarantee preimage resistance. Conversely, a second-preimage attack implies a collision attack (trivially, since, in addition to x ′, x is already known right from the start)
• For example, if the domain is size N, a range of size 0.99N is enough to guarantee that collision resistance implies preimage or second-preimage resistance. Said another way, if there are many collisions and you still* have a hard time finding them (collision resistance), then you can prove that it's also hard to find preimages or second preimages
• However, we prove that in conjunction with collision resistance, everywhere preimage resistance implies 'ordinary' (domain-based) preimage resistance. We show the implications of our result for iterated hash functions and hash chains, where the latter is related to the Winternitz one-time signature scheme
• collision resistance — it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd any two distinct inputs x, x′ which hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x) = h(x′). Fact Collision resistance implies 2nd-preimage resistance of hash functions. Note (collision resistance does not guarantee preimage resistance
• collision resistance — it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd any two distinct inputs x, x which hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x)=h(x). Fact Collision resistance implies 2nd-preimage resistance of hash functions. Note (collision resistance does not guarantee preimage resistance ### Difference between Second Pre-image Resistance and

Collision resistance is the property of a hash function that it is computationally infeasible to find two colliding inputs. This property is related to second preimage resistance, which is also known as weak collision resistance.A minimal requirement for a hash function to be collision resistant is that the length of its result should be 160 bits (in 2004) 2nd-preimage resistance — it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd any second input which has the same output as any speciﬁed input, i.e., givenx, to ﬁnd a 2nd-preimage x = x such that h(x)=h(x). collision resistance — it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd any two distinct inputs x, x which hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x)=h(x) Difference among (second) preimage resistance, collision resistance Home. Security_Code Background knowledge : y=h(x) → Hash-value(y) is created when you insert input-value(x) to the Hash function Preimage resistance : It is property to resist Preimage guess First, hash value(y) is identifie

, where B is a ppt second preimage adversary against h. Thus we finally have So there exists a hash function h' as defined which is second pre-image resistant but not collision resistant Since collision resistance is not important for password storing, and, as far as I know, all the popular hash functions are resistant enough to pre-image and second pre-image attacks to make it an infeasible approach, I guess those factors don't really matter Our characterization implies that collision-resistance and second-preimage resistance are equivalent, in an asymptotic sense, for this class. Furthermore, there is a polynomial-time procedure for determining whether such a Linicrypt program is collision/second-preimage resistant

### What's the difference between collision resistance and

• Relationships among Hash Functions Properties P5 ==> P4 If a hash function is collision resistant, then it is second-preimage resistant. Proof. Prove ½P4 ==> ½P5. Fix xj and find distinct xi such that H(xi) = H(xj) (by ½P4). Hence ½P5 is true since (xi,xj) is a pair of distinct inputs having the same hash value. P5 =/=> P
• Second preimage resistance is the property of a hash function that it is computationally infeasible to find any second input that has the same output as a given input. This property is related to preimage resistance and one-wayness; however, the later concept is typically used for functions with input and output domain of similar size (see one-way function)
• properties second pre-image-, target collision- or pre-image resistance when considering ideal functions. It is thus interesting to study the question of nding combiners with short output that are robust for any o
• Quantum preimage, 2nd-preimage, and collision resistance of SHA3. Jan Czajkowski and Leon Groot Bruinderink and Andreas Hülsing and Christian Schaffner. Abstract: SHA3 and its extendable output variant SHAKE belong to the family of sponge functions. In this work, we.
• In cryptography, a preimage attack on cryptographic hash functions tries to find a message that has a specific hash value. A cryptographic hash function should resist attacks on its preimage. In the context of attack, there are two types of preimage resistance: These can be compared with a collision resistance, in which it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x, x.
• Second Preimage Resistance vs. Collision Resistance. Second preimage resistance is like finding someone with the same birthday as you. There's only a 1/365 chance of someone having exactly your birthday, and if you're checking against a room full of 20 people, you have 20 chances for someone to match you
• Collision resistance and second-preimage resistance are fundamental properties of hash functions, and are the basis of security for hash-based signature schemes [10,11,4,7], which are a promising approach for post-quantum security

298 11 Hash Functions is given and we try to find x 2.This is called second preimage resistance or weak collision resistance. The second case is given if an attacker is free to choose both x 1 and x 2.This is referred to as strong collision resistance and is dealt with in the subsequent section. It is easy to see why second preimage resistance is important for the basic signature with hash. • 2nd-preimage resistance (weak collision resistance) - it is computationally infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as any specified input - i.e., given x, to find x' ≠ x such that h(x) = h(x') •.

### What is the difference between a second preimage attack

• The XOR-based method put forth by Bellare and Rogaway, and later improved by Shoup, is wildly used to construct target collision resistant hash functions. We consider the relationship between XOR-based target collision resistant hash functions and second preimage resistant compress functions. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we present the variants of evaluated second.
• Collision resistance is a property of cryptographic hash functions: a hash function is collision resistant if it is hard to find two inputs that hash to the same output; that is, two inputs a and b such that H(a) = H(b).. Every hash function with more inputs than outputs will necessarily have collisions. Consider a hash function such as SHA-256 that produces 256 bits of output from an.
• Second Preimages on n-bit Hash Functions for Much Less than 2n Work John Kelsey1 and Bruce Schneier2 1 National Institute of Standards and Technology, john.kelsey@nist.gov 2 Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., schneier@counterpane.com Abstract. We expand a previous result of Dean [Dea99] to provide a second preimage attack on all n-bit iterated hash functions with Damgard
• Let we have a hash function that is second preimage resistant but not collision-resistant. Then an adversary can create a pair of different messages M and M', M is benign and M' is malicious, for both of which the signature will be valid

Explain the following concepts: 1) collision resistance, 2) second preimage resistance, and 3) preimage resistance. 2. Explain what is unforgeability under a chosen-message attack. 3. Assume party A is communicating with party B. They have shared a secret key K for a MAC algorithm. Now, B receives a.. Collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance, but does not guarantee preimage resistance. Conversely, a second-preimage attack implies a collision attack (trivially, since, in addition to x′, x is already known right from the start). Applied preimage attacks. By definition.

• Fact Collision resistance implies 2nd-preimage resistance of hash functions. Note (collision resistance does not guarantee preimage resistance) In tryingtoformalizeand verifysuchstatements, certainaspectsofthe Englishare problematicand other aspects aren't
• One-Way vs. Collision Resistance One-wayness does not imply collision resistance • Suppose g is one-way • Define h(x) as g(x') where x' is x except the last bit - h is one-way (to invert h, must invert g) • Weak collision resistance (second-preimage resistance
• Relationship Between Hash Properties Collision Resistance implies 2 nd Preimage from ECE 568 at University of Toront

Collision resistance implies second pre-image resistance but does not imply pre-image resistance. The weaker assumption is always preferred in theoretical cryptography, but in practice, a hash-function which is only second pre-image resistant is considered insecure and is therefore not recommended for real applications tance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance. In Bimal K. Roy and Willi Meier, editors, astF Software Encryption 2004, volume 3017 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 371-388. Springer- erlag,V Berlin, German,y 2004. Concealed data aggregation in wireless sensor network

### Preimage attack - Wikipedi

1. Improved Collision and Preimage Resistance Bounds on PGV Schemes Lei Duo1 and Chao Li2 1 Department of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China Duoduolei@gmail.com 2 Department of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China Abstract. Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle(PGV) considered 6
2. In cryptography, a preimage attack on cryptographic hash functions tries to find a message that has a specific hash value. A cryptographic hash function should resist attacks on its preimage. In the context of attack, there are two types of preimage resistance: These can be compared with a collision resistance, in which it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x, x.
3. In this paper we describe fundamental concepts of cryptographic hash functions, such as collision resistance, preimage resistance, and second-preimage resistance. We then map these properties to the MD5 and SHA-256 hash algorithms, which are used to generate the Centera content address
4. Second preimage resistance? Collision resistance? Application 1: Password Storage Problem: Need to store passwords in a database for checking s Goal: Passwords are checkable, but can't be stolen if DB compromised Idea: Don't store password - store H(password
5. If we are confident that a hash function is collision resistant then we can also be confident that the hash function is preimage resistant. But MD5 has significant weaknesses. Hence many cryptographers (including people like Arjen Lenstra) think that MD5 no longer has the necessary safety margin to be used even in applications that only rely on preimage resistance and hence recommend to no.
6. 2 Second preimage resistance 3 One wayness preimage resistance 4 Randomness from ITC S-I581 at Charles Sturt Universit
7. Cryptography Introduction to collision resistance

Home Browse by Title Proceedings IMACC'11 The symbiosis between collision and preimage resistance. ARTICLE . The symbiosis between collision and preimage resistance. Share on. Authors: Elena Andreeva. ESAT/SCD---COSIC, Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and IBBT, Belgium Since generic collision attacks require 2n=2 work, and generic preimage attacks require 2 n work, a secure hash function should have the same level of resistance. In order to build more secure hash functions, or to protect oneself agains The difference is subtle but important: it is much easier to break collision resistance than it is to break second preimage resistance, a collision resistance attacker has the flexibility to choose both m1 and m2 in a way that makes finding a collision easier Prove that h′ is not preimage resistant, but still second-preimage and collision resis- tant. Solution: The modi ed hash function h ′ is not preimage resistant, since for an

Weaker properties implied by collision resistance Second-preimage resistance For a given sand input value x, it is infeasible for any polynomial-time adversary to nd x0with H s(x0) = H s(x) (except with negligible probability). If there existed a PPT adversary Athat can break the second-preimage Cryptography constructing compression functionsTo get certificate subscribe: https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto=====Playlist URL: https..

Second-preimage resistance; Collision resistance; Preimage Resistance. 哈希函数的 preimage 是指能够生成同一个特定指纹的所有输入的合集。即对于某个哈希函数 H 与摘要 k，所有能够生成 k 的输入值 x （满足 H(x). Practical Hash Functions Constructions Resistant to Generic Second Preimage Attacks Beyond the Birthday Bound Charles Bouillaguet , Pierre-Alain Fouque Ecole Normale Sup erieure, 45 rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris, and the fact that a second preimage is also a collision give a birthday-lower bound. However, there is still a gap between those. So,. Hence, using the algorithm for solving the second preimage problem one can ﬁnd a collision for the particular hash h. Hence, we can say that the property of collision resistance implies the propert

### >Since collision resistance is a stronger notion of

SHA-3 (Secure Hash Algorithm 3) is the latest member of the Secure Hash Algorithm family of standards, released by NIST on August 5, 2015. Although part of the same series of standards, SHA-3 is internally different from the MD5-like structure of SHA-1 and SHA-2.. SHA-3 is a subset of the broader cryptographic primitive family Keccak (/ ˈ k ɛ tʃ æ k / or / ˈ k ɛ tʃ ɑː k /), designed. A preimage or second preimage attack; Attack against collision resistance; Hence value 2^(m/2) determines strength of hash code against brute-force attacks; Birthday Attack The application of hash chains and hash structures to cryptography Thomas Page A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Royal Holloway, University of Londo

### The Symbiosis between Collision and Preimage Resistance

1. Show that collision resistance implies 2nd-preimage resistance of hash functions. 2. In the next example, show that collision resistance does not guarantee preimage resistance. Let g: {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n be a hash function which is collision resistant
2. RFC 4270 Attacks on Hashes November 2005 particularly [PKIX-MD5-construction], it is also important to consider which party can predict the material at the beginning of the hashed object. 2.1.Currently Known Attacks All the currently known practical or almost-practical attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 are collision attacks. This is fortunate: significant first- and second-preimage attacks on a hash.
3. Collision-resistant hash function 169 - H2 is a classical hash function such as MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD, HAVAL, - Given a y, ﬁnd x such that H1(x) = y is NP-Complete, - Find x1, x2 such that x1 6=x2 and H1(x1) = H1(x2)is NP-Complete, - For any input x, the length of H1(x) is not ﬁxed.This is the main difference wit

The attacker will easily recover S Second preimage resistant Guarantees that it from CSCI 361 at University of Wollongong Duba Collision resistance ⇒ 2nd preimage resistance Second scenario uFile system: Bob protects a file on his file system. MAC = H bob-pwd (File) uWhen accessing file, Bob verifies MAC. uNo one can modify file (without Bob' s pwd). File 1 Second preimage resistance: Given a message m 1, it should be hard to find a different message m 2 such that hash(k, m 1) = hash(k, m 2). This is the toughest of the three for students in cryptography to get their head around Our second and main contribution is the observation that in conjunction with collision resistance, everywhere preimage resistance is the right notion. We show that for an iterated hash function preimage resistance holds with respect to any input distribution of sufficient Rényi2-entropy provided that the hash function is collision re-sistant and its final part is everywhere preimage resistant CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): Abstract. We revisit the definitions of preimage resistance, focussing on the question of finding a definition that is simple enough to prove security against, yet flexible enough to be of use for most applications. We give an in-depth analysis of existing preimage resistance notions, introduce several new notions.

### Video: Merkle-Damgård Construction Method and Alternatives: A Revie 2nd-preimage resistance (weak collision resistance) - it is computationally infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as any specified input, i.e., given x, to find x' x such that h(x) = h(x' I will try to be as simple as possible. I will start with the weak collision resistant property also known as second pre-image resistance. If we are given a key x and h(x) then it is computationally expensive to find x' != x such as h(x') = h(..

### Collision First Preimage Second Preimage Attacks and

To test the pre-image resistance property, your goal is to ﬁnd a string which collides with the ﬁrst 24 bits of a given SHA-256 sum. For example, a 24 bit collision for the above hash would be 0xd7a8fb collision resistant preimage resistant 2nd Figure 9.1:Simpliﬁed classiﬁcation of cryptographic hash functions and applications. 3. collision resistance — it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd any two distinct inputs x, x0which hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x)=h(x0) Any collision between messages of less than ' blocks on Hf can be transformed into a collision on f in O(') computations. 16/29. This mode has optimal resistance to generic second preimage attacks. Proof. Let be the success probability of the adversary against Hf, f is replace

### COMP6441 : Hashes, Preimage and collision resistance - YouTub

The meaning of difficult is quite well defined in this context: 2^n for preimage and second preimage resistance, and 2^(n/2) for collision resistance. While we can't prove that the problem is that hard, a hash function is considered broken, once algorithm are known which are faster than these bounds • Second Preimage Resistance (Weak Col. Res.): It is computationally infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as any - If the compression function is preimage resistant and collision resistant the hash function is preimage resistant and collision resistant • Other Constructions - HAIFA, EMD, RMX,. Second preimage resistance Collision resistance Multicollision resistance Security against length extension attack Chosen-target-forced-pre x preimage resistance..... Chosen-target-forced-pre x (CTFP) preimage resistance (security against herding attack Second preimage-resistance 2n−1 Collision-resistance 1.2·2n/2 Table 1: Complexity of generic attacks on diﬀerent properties of hash functions. H A na¨ıve implementation of the birthday attack would store 2n/2 previously computed el-ements in a data structure supporting quick stores and look-ups

Question: There Are Three Desirable Properties For Cryptographic Hash Functions: Preimage Resistant (or Onewayness), Second Preimage Resistant, And Collision-resistant. For Each Of The Following Applications Of Hash Functions, Explain Which Of These Three Properties Are Needed And Which Are Not. • Alice Poses To Bob A Tough Math Problem And Claims She Has Solved. Toutes les attaques pratiques ou presque pratiques actuellement connues sur les fonctions MD5 et SHA-1 sont des attaques de collisions , . En général, une attaque de collisions est plus facile à monter qu'une attaque de préimage, car elle ne se limite pas par une valeur spécifique (n'importe quelles deux valeurs peuvent être utilisées pour créer une collision) A. second preimage resistant B. preimage resistant C. strong collision resistant D. collision resistant 8. The property protects against a sophisticated class of attack known as the birthday attack. A. preimage resistant B. one-way C. collision resistant D. second preimage resistant. Provide formal definitions for second preimage resistance and preimage resistance. Prove that any hash function that is collision resistant is sec- ond preimage resistant, and any hash function that is second preimage resistant is preimage resistant

### Collision resistance SpringerLin

• Collision resistance implies second preimage resistance • Collisions, if we could find them, would give signatories a way to repudiate their signatures - Due to birthday paradox, k should be large enough • Preimage resistance - Assuming 234 trials per second, can do 289 trials per year - Will take 271 years to invert SHA-1 on a random image . One-Way vs. Collision Resistance One-wayness does not imply collision resistance • Suppose g().

### Difference among (second) preimage resistance, collision

• weak collision resistance (2nd preimage resistance) - given an input x, it is computationally infeasible to find a second input x' such that h(x') = h(x) strong collision resistance (collision resistance) - it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs
• Question: Birthday Collision We Use Birthday Collision To Illustrate Breaking The Three Desirable Properties For Cryp- Tographic Hash Functions: Preimage Resistant, Second Preimage Resistant, And Collision-resistant. As- Sume That There Are 365 Days In A Year, And The Birthday Of Each Person Is Distributed Uniformly. We Consider Three Groups: Group A Has 25 Persons,.
• -second preimage resistant and collision resistant Don't use these. Be more specific! Formal treatmen

Differently from Second-preimage resistance, here the attacker can choose both x1 and x2 and he is not given a x1 that he has to find a second-preimage of. Thus this latter property implies the previous one, i.e., if a hash is collision resistant it is also second-preimage resistant This property of cryptographic hash function is called second-preimage resistance (or weak collision resistance) and for SHA-1 the brute force attack requires 2^160 computations. Even the proposed non-brute-force attacks require at least 2^128 computations, which is computationally infeasible for the foreseeable millenia Second preimage-resistance 2n−1 Collision-resistance 1.2·2n/2 Table 1: Complexity of generic attacks on diﬀerent properties of hash functions. H A na¨ıve implementation of the birthday attack would store 2n/2 previously computed elements in a data structure supporting quick stores and look-ups In cryptography, a collision attack on a cryptographic hash tries to find two inputs producing the same hash value, i.e. a hash collision.This is in contrast to a preimage attack where a specific target hash value is specified.. There are roughly two types of collision attacks: Collision attack Find two different messages m1 and m2 such that hash(m1) = hash(m2) 2. By considering the analogy of a birthday being a 'hash' of a person's identity explain the following terms (a) preimage resistance (b) second preimage resistance c) collision resistance (d) the birthday paradox Firstly, we provide a full picture of the relationships between eTCR and each of the seven security properties for a dedicatedkey hash function, considered by Rogaway and Shrimpton at FSE'04; namely, collision resistance (CR), the three variants of second-preimage resistance (Sec, aSec, eSec) and the three variants of preimage resistance (Pre, aPre, ePre) Second Preimage Resistance (Weak Collision Resistance) Given input m 1, it should be hard to find another message m 2 such that hashing)=hash(m 2) and that m 1 ≠m 2. Strong Collision Resistance. It ought to be hard to find two messages m 1 ≠m 2 such that hash(m 1)=hash(m 2)

We consider basic notions of security for cryptographic hash functions: collision resistance, preimage resistance, and second-preimage resistance. We give seven di#erent definitions that correspond to these three underlying ideas, and then we work out all of the implications and separations among these seven definitions within the concrete-security, provable-security framewor However, collision resistance does not imply preimage resistance, at least in the strict sense. That might seem rather strange, since it implies that we could have a hash function for which, given a digest, or at least some digest, we can efficiently find a message that produces that digest 5. second preimage resistant (weak collision resistant) 6. COLLISION RESISTANT. A strong hash function protects against. an attack in which one party generates a message for another party to sign. The Sponge Construction-underlying structure of SHA-3, Takes an input message and partitions it into fixed-size block discuss and semi-formally verify the resistance against 2nd collision attacks. Related Proposals. The double-pipe hash may remind the readers of the RIPEMD-family of hash functions [22,8], K-way (2nd) preimage for K ≥ 1: Given Y (or M with H(M) = Y), ﬁnd CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): We consider basic notions of security for cryptographic hash functions: collision resistance, preimage resistance, and second-preimage resistance. We give seven di#erent definitions that correspond to these three underlying ideas, and then we work out all of the implications and separations among these seven.

collision resistance second preimage •We can reduce collision resistance to second preimageproblem -i.e. If we have an algorithm to attack the 2 nd collision resitance 2nd preimage CR preimageproblem, then we can solve the collision problem 28 findCollisions1(h, Q) {choose x randomly from Second pre-image resistance: ! Given x in X, it is computationally infeasible to compute a different value x' in X such that h(x) = h(x') ! Weak collision-resistance (sometimes also called target collision-resistance) ! Why we need this property? •Preimage resistance -Assuming 234 trials per second, can do 289 trials per year -Will take 271 years to invert SHA-1 on a random image Birthday Paradox One-Way vs. Collision Resistance!One-wayness does not imply collision resistance •Suppose g is one-way •Define h(x) as g. In general, collision resistance property provides second preimage resistance for a hash function. MNF-256 has shown good collision resistance. So both, preimage and 2nd-preimage attacks would require at least 2 256 operations, implying that the proposed hash function has a strong resistance against such attacks

-Second pre-image resistance -Collision resistance • These properties are crucial for digital signatures security 9 maggio 2018 Digital signatures 34. 2nd preimage resistance • Let (G, S, V) be a signature scheme • A trusted third party chooses a message x that Alice signs producing s = S(d Cryptographic Hash-Function Basics: Definitions, Implications, and Separations for Preimage Resistance, Second-Preimage Resistance, and Collision Resistance By Phillip Rogaway and Thomas Shrimpton Get PDF (259 KB

Low Power Ajit Pal IIT Kharagpur 3 The first reduction • Oracle-2nd-Preimage is an (ε,q) algorithm. • Since it is a Las-Vegas algorithm, if it gives an answer it will be correct. Thus, x≠x' and h(x)=h(x'). Thus the collision is also found A hash function that satisfies the properties of variable input size, fixed output size, efficiency, preimage resistant and second preimage resistant is referred to as a _____. birthday paradox The effort required for a collision resistant attack is explained by a mathematical result referred to as the ___________ CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): Abstract. A (k, l) hash-function combiner for property P is a construction that, given access to l hash functions, yields a single cryptographic hash function which has property P as long as at least k out of the l hash functions have that property. Hash function combiners are used to hedge against the failure of one. Cryptographic Hash Function: A cryptographic hash function is a type of security mechanism that produces a hash value, message digest or checksum value for a specific data object   • Fullmakt arvskifte Nordea.
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